Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) — renamed Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE) in recent doctrine to reflect operations beyond conventional battlefields — is the systematic, continuous process by which the intelligence staff analyzes the threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific geographic area. IPB is the foundational analytical method of tactical and operational intelligence: every collection plan, threat assessment, and intelligence contribution to operational planning derives from it.

The four-step process

Step 1: Define the operational environment

The intelligence staff defines the geographic extent of the area of operations (AO) and the area of interest (AI) — the broader area beyond the AO from which threats may emerge. This step also identifies the significant characteristics of the environment: terrain, weather, infrastructure, population, political dynamics, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The distinction between AO (where the unit operates) and AI (from which threats can affect the unit) is consequential: intelligence must monitor the AI to provide warning, even though the unit’s operations are confined to the AO.

Step 2: Describe environmental effects on operations

The intelligence staff analyzes how the environment affects both friendly and adversary operations:

Terrain analysis. Using the OAKOC framework:

  • Observation and fields of fire — where can forces see and shoot?
  • Avenues of approach — what routes can forces use to move toward objectives?
  • Key terrain — what terrain confers operational advantage to whoever controls it?
  • Obstacles — what natural and manmade features impede movement?
  • Cover and concealment — what terrain provides protection from fire (cover) or observation (concealment)?

The product is the Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) — a graphic overlay showing avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and their effects on movement.

Weather analysis. Temperature, precipitation, wind, visibility, and their effects on operations, collection systems, and adversary capabilities.

Civil considerations. Using the ASCOPE framework:

  • Areas — population centers, cultural sites, government facilities
  • Structures — bridges, dams, power plants, communications infrastructure
  • Capabilities — local resources, infrastructure capacity
  • Organizations — governmental, tribal, religious, criminal, insurgent
  • People — demographics, attitudes, key leaders, grievances
  • Events — elections, religious observances, market days, seasonal patterns

Civil considerations are increasingly central to IPB in counterinsurgency, stability operations, and the multi-domain operating environment.

Step 3: Evaluate the threat

The intelligence staff develops a detailed understanding of the adversary’s doctrine, organization, equipment, capabilities, and tendencies:

Threat model. How does the adversary fight? What is the adversary’s doctrine for the type of operation being conducted? The threat model is doctrinal — it describes how the adversary should fight based on its training and doctrine.

Threat template. A doctrinal graphic showing how the adversary deploys for a specific type of operation — attack, defense, retrograde — given its organizational structure. The threat template is generic; it shows doctrinal dispositions, not the actual current disposition.

Order of battle. The intelligence term for the adversary’s actual composition, disposition, strength, equipment, training, logistics, and effectiveness. OB factors provide the baseline against which current operations are assessed.

Step 4: Determine threat courses of action

The intelligence staff develops the adversary’s most probable courses of action:

Situational template. A graphic depiction of how the adversary is expected to deploy and operate given the specific terrain, weather, and operational situation. Unlike the threat template (which is doctrinal and generic), the situational template is specific to the current operation.

Event template and matrix. The event template identifies Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) — geographic areas where adversary activity will confirm or deny a specific course of action. The event matrix specifies what activity at each NAI will indicate — “If adversary forces are observed at NAI 3 (the road junction at grid XY 1234), this confirms COA 2 (attack along Avenue of Approach Bravo).”

Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). The adversary course of action the intelligence staff assesses as most probable given the adversary’s doctrine, capabilities, and the situation.

Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA). The adversary course of action that, if adopted, would pose the greatest threat to the friendly mission — regardless of its probability.

IPB as continuous process

IPB is not a one-time event but a continuous process that updates as the situation develops. The intelligence staff refines its threat assessment, updates situational templates, and adjusts NAIs and PIRs as new information arrives and as the adversary acts. The event template is the intelligence staff’s hypothesis about what the adversary will do; collection against NAIs tests that hypothesis; the results drive refinement.

IPB beyond conventional warfare

In counterinsurgency, stability operations, and other irregular warfare contexts, IPB’s conventional framework (designed for state-on-state warfare with identifiable military units) must be adapted:

  • The “threat” may be a network rather than a military organization
  • Order of battle analysis may be replaced by social network analysis
  • Civil considerations (ASCOPE) may be more important than terrain analysis
  • The adversary’s “doctrine” may be improvised rather than formal
  • The relevant indicators may be social, economic, or political rather than military

This adaptation challenge — extending intelligence methods designed for conventional warfare to non-conventional adversaries — is the tactical version of the legibility problem the 2026 Iran war analysis identifies at the strategic level.