This lesson introduces the content types that a Philosophical ASR adds to the general type vocabulary. After completing it, you should be able to identify which type a philosophical page should have and what relations it needs.
How philosophical types differ from mathematical ones
Mathematical types are governed by provability: a theorem without a proof is ill-formed. Philosophical types are governed by arguability: a claim without an argument is weaker (an assertion), but not ill-formed. The threshold for structural error is different.
The philosophical dependency graph can be cyclic. A claim generates arguments; arguments face objections; objections receive responses; responses may revise the original claim. This is not a defect — it is how philosophical inquiry works.
The types
claim
A proposition advanced as true. The atomic unit of philosophical discourse. Unlike a mathematical axiom (taken as given) or theorem (required to be proven), a claim invites evaluation. It says: here is something I think is true, and I am prepared to argue for it.
SHOULD have argued-by: — but a claim without arguments is an assertion, not an error.
MAY have tradition: — identifying the discourse context (e.g., relational-ontology, classical-logic).
argument
A structured case supporting a claim. Has premises and a conclusion, and the relationship between them is made explicit.
MUST have supports: — an argument that does not say what it argues for is ill-formed.
SHOULD have argument-form: — what kind of inference? Deductive (the conclusion follows necessarily), inductive (the conclusion is probable), abductive (the conclusion is the best explanation), transcendental (the conclusion is a condition of possibility), dialectical (the conclusion emerges from contradiction).
objection
A challenge to a claim or argument. Identifies a weakness: an invalid inference, a false premise, an unconsidered case, an alternative explanation.
MUST have targets: — an objection that does not say what it objects to is ill-formed.
MAY have proposes: — advancing an alternative claim.
response
A reply to an objection. Defends the original claim or argument, possibly in modified form.
MUST have addresses: — a response that does not say what objection it responds to is ill-formed.
MUST engage with the substance — dismissing the objection or repeating the original claim is not a response.
MAY have revises: (modifying the original claim) or concedes: (partially accepting the objection).
What the types track
The types track the structure of engagement, not its outcome. The spec cannot say whether a claim is true — it can say whether a claim has arguments, whether those arguments face objections, and whether those objections have been addressed. This makes the state of inquiry visible and transparent.
Check for understanding
Given a page that says “relations are ontologically prior to entities” and provides three reasons:
- What type should it be? (It advances a proposition and argues for it → could be a
claimpage with a linkedargumentpage, or a single page combining both) - What relations does the claim need? (SHOULD:
argued-by:linking to the argument) - What relations does the argument need? (MUST:
supports:linking back to the claim)
Given a page that says “substance ontology provides a simpler account” in response to the relational priority claim:
- What type should it be? (
objection) - What MUST relation does it need? (
targets:linking to the claim or argument it challenges) - If it also advances an alternative view, what additional relation? (
proposes:linking to the alternative claim)
Key takeaway
Philosophical types have fewer structural requirements than mathematical ones, but the requirements that exist are still constitutive. An objection that targets nothing is not an objection. A response that addresses nothing is not a response. The types make these structural roles explicit.